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This study considers whether differences between accounting regimes lead to 
biased expected earnings that may have cost of capital effects. The study focuses on 
the European setting where different standard setting authorities have continued to 
function in the presence of the gradual harmonization of the underlying legal 
framework. The recent requirement for the application of IFRS (International 
Financial Reporting Standards) by listed firms from 2005 onwards marks a major step 
in the integration process. The paper assesses the available evidence on the impact of 
local GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) on the cost of equity capital 
in Europe in the period leading up to the regulatory changes that are now under way, 
and provides preliminary evidence on the effect of the voluntary pre-adoption of 
international standards.  
Ideally, allowing for risk and growth factors, investors should be able to see 
through any bias arising from GAAP differences and make appropriate adjustments to 
the forward earnings yield, i.e., the ratio that relates expected earnings to the current 
price. Basically, comparability of forward earnings yields requires that any bias in 
forthcoming earnings will reverse in subsequent years so that the accounting method 
that is used should not affect intrinsic value estimates. On the other hand, the inability 
of investors to fully restore the effects of the bias in expected earnings would lead to 
earnings yields that are not comparable and prices that are not set in a homogeneous 
way. 
It is usual to determine the share price as the present value of future cash flows, 
consisting of the dividends that are expected per share and the price to be received 
when the share is sold. However, the price at the end of the holding period depends in 
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turn on dividends expected after that date. Therefore, in the most basic valuation 
model, an infinite stream of expected dividends values the share as follows:  
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where dt is the dividend per share in each future period t, r is the cost of capital and P0 
is the current share price.  
Ohlson and Juettner (2005) show that, for any sequence of numbers {yt} that 
satisfy    (1+r)-tyt →  0 as t ,∞→  then  
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and, therefore, by combining equations (1) and (2),  
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where yt can be any number that satisfies condition (2). This is a general formula for 
any valuation model that is derived from (1). For example, if yt equals 0, then (3) 
transforms to the dividend discount model (2). If yt equals book value per share bt, 
then (3) transforms instead to the residual income model.1 
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1 For a detailed presentation of the unified valuation framework presented here, see also Gode and 
Ohlson (2006).  
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On the other hand, if yt is capitalised expected earnings
2, where 
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then condition (2) still holds but (3) transforms to the pricing model that informs the 
analysis in this paper:- 
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The z sequence represents capitalised expected abnormal earnings, that is the surplus 
over the normal earnings expected from the reinvestment of the previous period’s 
earnings. In this formulation, the dividend irrelevancy property is satisfied by adding 
the term r·dt to represent the foregone investment opportunity at the cost of capital r 
of having paid dividends dt. Assuming that abnormal earnings grow in time at a rate 
(1+g), where r>g≥0, then (5) can be summarized as the abnormal earnings growth 
model, as follows:  
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Based on (6), Easton (2004) argues that, if the forecast of next period’s accounting 
earnings is equal to the equilibrium economic income (the product of the expected 
rate of return and the beginning of period price), accounting earnings are sufficient for 
valuation by definition, and also that the forward earnings yield is equal to the cost of 
                                                
2 The focus on expected earnings is consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1961) who suggest that 
equity values are determined by the earnings power of the firm’s assets and its investment policy, and 
not by how the earnings are distributed.  
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equity. However, if e1 does not equal economic income (as is mostly likely to happen, 
due to the conservative nature of accounting systems which defer the recognition of 
positive value shocks), then valuation based on accounting earnings requires forecasts 
beyond the next period.
3
 Therefore, as made clear by Easton (2004), the abnormal 
earnings growth in (6) 
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accounting earnings and economic income in any one period must be captured in the 
accounting earnings of other periods.  
Multiplying both sides of equation (6) by the cost of capital, it is evident that the 
difference between the equilibrium economic income r·P0 and accounting earnings e1 
is determined by both the short term growth in accounting earnings and the long term 
growth in abnormal earnings, as follows:  
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Whilst abnormal earnings grow at the long term rate g, short term growth in earnings 
is incorporated as the change from e1 to e2, adjusted for the previous period’s retained 
earnings reinvestment. Although the latter suggests that dividend policy is irrelevant 
in the short term, equation (7) implies nevertheless that, given a sufficiently generous 
dividend policy, 1  as  1e e g tt t → + →∞− .4 In other words, as Ohlson and Juettner 
                                                
3 See Pope and Walker (1999) and Beaver and Ryan (2005) for a more thorough analysis of accounting 
conservatism. The difference between economic and accounting earnings stems from under-recognised 
positive value shocks, which are the source of expected accounting earnings growth.  
4 A sufficiently generous dividend policy would be a payout ratio that exceeds (r-g)/r. In the long term, 
it can be expected that, as the competitive advantage of the firm fades away, it would be reasonable to 
assume an almost full payout policy as it is implausible that earnings will be re-invested in the firm for 
ever. Consistent with the development of these arguments, the growth rate g is assumed in Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) to approximate an economy-wide growth rate.  
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(2005) and Ohlson and Gode (2006) show, the growth in accounting earnings decays 
in the long term towards the abnormal earnings growth rate g.  
ACCOUNTING DIVERSITY AND THE FORWARD EARNINGS YIELD 
Equation (7) scaled by P0 shows that the forward earnings yield 1 0e P  will consist 
of the cost of equity capital, i.e., the risk free rate rf plus the risk premium r-rf, less the 
(discounted) abnormal earnings yield, as follows:  
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Equation (8) shows that any cross-country variation in the forward earnings yield 
must be induced by three factors – the variation in country specific risk free rates, the 
variation in risk premia and the variation in the abnormal earnings yield, where the 
latter corrects the initial understatement of e1 when accounting earnings are less than 
economic income.   
In integrated financial markets, risk is likely to be priced homogeneously, as 
market mechanisms are more able to eliminate pricing differences through arbitrage. 
Thus, integrated financial markets are likely to be characterised by little variation in 
country-specific risk free rates and risk premia, if sector effects remain constant 
across the countries involved. This is not likely to happen with respect to the forward 
earnings yield as long as accounting is not harmonised, or to be more precise, when 
there are still systematic differences across countries in the recognition of value 
shocks in accounting earnings.  
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Recent research has shown that different accounting systems bring about different 
speeds of recognition of value shocks in accounting earnings, leading to country 
specific variability in the extent to which accounting earnings differ from economic 
earnings.
5
 Based on equation (7), which expresses the difference between economic 
income and accounting earnings in terms of the abnormal earnings yield, our proposal 
is that variability in the speed of recognition of value shocks in accounting earnings 
induces significant country variation in the abnormal earnings yield.6  
In contrast to the diversity in accounting rules and regulations that has held sway 
over European markets until recently, the new phase of standardization that is 
currently under way is based on the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards by all listed companies in the EU from 2005 onwards. In principle, this 
should lead to similarity in the recognition of value shocks when the circumstances in 
which firms operate are the same. This would be the case, for example, if firms 
operate in the same industry, even though they may be registered in different 
jurisdictions. Thus, when accounting is harmonised and financial markets are 
integrated, the variation in the earnings yield as described in (8) would be attributed to 
sector effects in both the risk premium and abnormal earnings yield, and country 
effects would be insignificant. Furthermore, earnings yields would be directly 
comparable across countries, and such comparability would only require knowledge 
                                                
5 See Ball, Kothari and Robin (2001), Giner and Rees (2001), Garcia Lara and Mora (2004) and 
Raonic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos (2004) for empirical evidence on the varying speed of value 
shock recognition in accounting earnings internationally. 
6 Note that, under converging economies and integrated markets, the country-specific variation in r and 
g should not influence country-specific variation in the abnormal yield. In the context of (8), this 
variation is likely to be driven mostly by abnormal earnings at time t=2 (which is dividend policy 
irrelevant, and therefore country-specific factors in dividend policy should also be of no consequence). 
Ideally, an examination of abnormal earnings at time t≥3 would provide further insight into the way in 
which accounting earnings catch up with economic earnings in different countries and a better 
assessment of country variation at different points on the forecast horizon.    
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of industry-specific practices with respect to the recognition of value shocks in 
accounting earnings.7 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The influence of harmonization is examined by modelling systematic effects in the 
forward earnings yield and its components that were described in equation (8). More 
specifically, the firm panel data is cross-categorised by country and sector in order to 
assess the relevant influence of these factors on the forward earnings yield, the risk 
premium and the abnormal earnings yield.8 The preferred regression approach is one 
that allows for observations that are independent across groups but not within groups 
as this provides a statistical test for the significance of country and sector effects that 
is robust with respect to correlation within panels. The regression is estimated as 
iitcsi eMCγβαµEP +++++=                                                                                (9) 
where EPi denotes the forward earnings yield for firm i, and where µ is the average 
earnings yield across all firms and all years, with sector effects αs, country effects βc 
and time effects γt. Market capitalization MCi is also included in the model as a 
covariate that controls for size effects. 
                                                
7 Land and Lang (2002) examine cross-country differences in trailing earnings yields, finding that they 
have become more similar over time. However, as Yee (2004) explains, the forward earnings which are 
employed in the present study demand less of accrual accounting than trailing earnings, and are more 
accurate equity valuation attributes. 
8 Estimation of the implied cost of equity capital and risk premia in the context of the Ohlson-Juettner 
(2005) model has already been reported in the accounting research literature, the estimation being 
substantiated by reasonable association with various risk proxies - see Gode and Mohanram (2003) and 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005). The cost of equity capital is also implied by other equity valuation 
models, and may be estimated accordingly. The research design in this paper is developed from the 
analysis in equations 6-8, this particular model being particularly appropriate for international 
comparison as it is not subject to dirty surplus biases - see Fen, Jorgensen and Yoo (2004) for a 
discussion of the impact of dirty suplus accounting on the implied cost of capital.  
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The same panel data structure is employed to assess country and sector effects in 
the risk premium, that is to say with r-rf as the dependent variable in (9) instead of 
EP. Assuming that there is little variation in risk free rates, which has been the case in 
Europe in recent years, the main driver for systematic variation in the cost of capital 
would be country effects in the risk premium. Evidence that risk premia have 
converged is provided when the βc in (9) are jointly insignificant after controlling for 
sector effects.9 It is worth noting also that, if the cross-country variation in earnings 
yields remains significant even when the risk premia have converged, this could imply 
that accounting diversity is not an impediment to financial market integration. To the 
extent that financial market integration coincides with economic convergence, there 
should be less systematic variation in the abnormal earnings yield.  Substituting the 
abnormal earnings yield as the dependent variable in (9) instead of EP, the joint 
significance of βc is expected to decrease although it will not be removed entirely 
whilst accounting harmonization remains incomplete. 
Overall, it is expected that, given the degree of European financial market 
integration in recent years, cross-country variation in the forward earnings yield is 
likely to be driven to a great extent by the remaining constraints on accounting 
harmonization that are reflected in systematic differences across jurisdictions in the 
rate of recognition of economic income. 
 
                                                
9 In their analysis of equity market returns in Europe, Adjaouté and Danthine (2004) show a 
diminishing role for geographical diversification as financial integration has deepened, and an 
increasing role for industrial diversification. In this respect, therefore, sector effects are expected to 
determine the implied cost of equity capital to an extent that is greater than country effects.  
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THE USE OF ANALYSTS’ FORECASTS AS A PROXY FOR EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS 
An important issue underlying the estimation of (9) is that investors’ expectations 
are unobservable, and analysts’ forecasts are used instead as a proxy. The main body 
of literature on analysts’ forecasts shows them to be both biased and inaccurate. 
However, more recent advances show that the evidence on inaccuracy is largely due 
to earnings’ management practices rather than to analysts’ own irrationality 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). Basu and Markov (2004) also reject the prior 
evidence on analysts’ irrationality, explaining that the tests first reported in the study 
by De Bont and Thaler (1990) relied crucially on the nature of the forecast error that 
analysts aim to minimise.10 On the other hand, Helbok and Walker (2004) argue that 
analysts are aware of the conservative nature of reported earnings and its influence on 
future earnings. They show that analysts revise current period forecasts to reflect 
value shocks in an asymmetric manner, and one period ahead forecasts to account for 
the reversal in the over/under recognition of current news in reported earnings. 
Consequently, earnings forecasts that are produced at the time of the announcement of 
previous year earnings are likely to appear as unbiased when value shocks during the 
current fiscal year are positive (because positive shocks are hardly recognised in the 
                                                
10 Other research shows that analyst job turnover is associated with the mean absolute error of their 
forecasts (see Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 1999 and Hong and Kubik, 2003). With respect to analysts’ 
incentives to generate business by means of optimistic forecasts, Irvine (2004) shows that individual 
analysts’ forecast errors are not associated with increased trading by brokerage firms; instead, it is 
positive stock recommendations that generate trading commissions. Lin and McNichols (1998) find no 
evidence that affiliated analysts’ earnings forecasts, either for the current year or for one year ahead, 
exhibit greater optimism than do unaffiliated analysts’ forecasts. However, both Lin and McNichols 
(1998) and Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) report greater optimism with respect to long term 
earnings growth, which is more consistent with optimistic recommendations. The drawback in these 
studies however is that the association between affiliated analysts and optimism is observed under the 
special circumstances of an equity offering, where substantial underwriting fees are involved (see 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 2000, on the positive association of underwriting fees and optimism).  
 10 
current year), and optimistic when the news during the year is negative (because 
negative value shocks are recognised to a greater extent than positive shocks).   
The second potential criticism with respect to the use of analysts’ forecasts as 
proxies of earnings forecasts in the context of a comparison of local accounting 
regimes is that forecasts are based on adjusted reported earnings, and, as a result of 
this adjustment, they may not necessarily reflect international differences in 
accounting. Analysts’ forecasts are indeed free of extraordinary items that could 
contribute to country variation in the earnings yield. However, as these items are 
transitory, this does not affect the evidence from the present study, which focuses on 
core earnings.11 
ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GAAP REGIMES 
The sample consists of firms reporting under their local GAAP, originating from 
16 European jurisdictions (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and UK). Not all of the countries involved are member states of the EU, but Norway 
and Switzerland are included due to their close economic ties with the rest of Europe. 
The period examined in the study is from 1994 to 2003, and the sample comprises 
both active firms at the census date and inactive firms that ceased operations during 
the period. It should be noted that, before 1994, coverage of analysts’ forecasts for 
these markets was not representative, especially with respect to Ireland and Greece. 
                                                
11 It should be noted that the reported earnings figure is not a good proxy for earnings expectations 
since it includes value shocks that are not relevant to the current price. The extent to which we still 
observe country variation, even with smoothed earnings estimates, implies that sophisticated market 
participants will perceive accounting in the European market as not yet fully harmonised.  
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Two sub-periods are taken into consideration in the analysis, as events suggest that 
the effects of financial integration are likely to have accelerated since 2000. 
Annual data on market capitalization, the dividend payout ratio, and the book to 
market ratio are drawn from the Worldscope database in Thomson Financials. The 
dividend payout ratio is averaged over the three years prior to the relevant point 
estimates and then multiplied by the earnings expectation one year ahead to obtain an 
estimate of the forthcoming year’s expected dividends. Earnings expectations are 
proxied by IBES median forecasts. An important issue that arises when combining 
data from various databases concerns the different adjustment factors employed to 
render earnings per share and prices comparable over time, mostly by adjusting for 
capital issues and stock splits. To circumvent this problem, earnings per share 
forecasts in IBES are multiplied by the number of shares provided in IBES and then 
divided by market capitalization to calculate EP. 
The sample is restricted to firms that report with a December year end. As at the 
end of December, the current forecast is for the accounting year ending on that date. 
The model requires earnings forecasts for the year following the current forecast and 
for the year after that. For these predictions of forthcoming earnings, the median of 
December forecasts is employed for each of the two accounting years ending 12 
months and 24 months later. Appropriate controls have been taken to ensure that the 
forecasts satisfy the 12 and 24 months year end. Furthermore, firms whose one year 
ahead earnings forecast and growth is negative are excluded since it is possible neither 
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to reinvest negative earnings nor to perpetuate negative earnings growth. 12 For the 
primary analysis, these specifications yielded the cost of equity for 11,395 firm-year 
observations that are designated by Worldscope as reporting under local GAAP. 13 
Finally, in order to infer the cost of equity capital from earning expectations in 
analysts’ forecasts, the present study employs the Ohlson and Juettner (2005) pricing 
methodology in (6), and for the parameter g, which represents an economy wide 
growth factor, we make three different assumptions in order to examine the sensitivity 
of our inferences to the growth rates employed in the estimation of the implied cost of 
capital. First, g is approximated by the risk free rate, and second by expected inflation. 
In the latter case, Gode and Mohanram (2003) suggest that an approximation can be 
obtained by deducting the long term real growth of the economy (about 3% in the US) 
from the risk free rate, a method adopted by Cheng et al. (2003) in an international 
context. In this paper however, following Leuz and Hail (2005), we base our second 
measure on the Consumer Price Index, and more specifically the average of the two 
years ahead annual CPI growth rate. In the third case, the hypotheses are tested under 
the assumption that g=0. Risk free rates (i.e, the ten year government bond yield) and 
CPI data are extracted from Datastream.  
                                                
12 A potential remedy to this limitation is to replace the short term growth in earnings with the average 
growth in the medium term. This strategy however would compromise considerably the representation 
of smaller firms and those from smaller markets.    
13 Out of 16,080 firm-year observations that satisfied the December year-end criterion, with earnings 
forecasts available for both one and two years ahead, together with the necessary information on the 
respective number of shares and on whether the firm was reporting under either local, IAS or US 
GAAP, 759 were deleted because earnings one year ahead were negative. A further 1,336 were deleted 
because the change in earnings between one and two years ahead was negative. With respect to the 
firm-years under local GAAP, out of the remaining 12,462, another 1067 observations were deleted as 
there were no available data on Worldscope or a computation of the cost of capital was impossible. As 
to the IAS and US GAAP, samples vary depending on the research design of the test where these 
observations are employed.  
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Estimates of the abnormal earnings yield and the risk premium under these three 
assumptions are presented on a country, sector and yearly basis in Table 1, together 
with details of the risk free rate and the forward earnings yield. The abnormal 
earnings yield represents the expected earnings growth that is priced in the earnings 
yield. Thus, low earnings yields due to conservatism should also be characterised by 
higher abnormal earnings yield. This is the case for Germany and Italy, for example, 
which have the lowest earnings yields among the 16 countries covered by Panel A 
(0.0548 for Germany and 0.574 for Italy), but also a relatively high level of abnormal 
earnings yield (eg. 0.0711 and 0.779, when government bond yield is taken as the 
proxy for long term growth). On the other hand, the earnings yields in Ireland and the 
Netherlands are the two highest in the sample (0.0847 for Ireland and 0.885 for the 
Netherlands), whilst the respective abnormal earnings yields are the lowest under all 
growth assumptions (eg. 0.0421 and 0.426 when g is set at the government bond 
yield). The trade-off between the earnings yield and the abnormal earnings yield at the 
country level is evident in Figure 1, which illustrates the inverse relationship 
graphically. On the other hand, this trade-off does not seem to be present at the 
industry level, as the descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 1 reveal in all sectors 
except one.14 The absence of such effects at the sector level is also illustrated in 
Figure 1, thus supporting the hypothesis that the differences in degrees of value 
recognition in the earnings yield and the abnormal earnings yield seem to be driven 
primarily by accounting diversity across countries rather than by industry specific 
characteristics.  
                                                
14 The exception is the technology sector, a special case which was greatly influenced by the internet 
bubble that started in the mid 1990s. At this time, investors and analysts may have expected more 
growth in perpetuity rather than in the immediate future and therefore would have incorporated a 
greater portion of the value driver in forecasted abnormal earnings growth than in forward earnings.  
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Finally, it can be seen in Panel C of Table 1 that the trade-off between earnings 
yields and abnormal earnings is not present on a yearly basis, since the country effects 
(which are considered to drive this) and the sector effects are aggregated.15 Perhaps 
the most important evidence in Panel C is the decreasing risk free rate, the long term 
government bond yield falling as one would expect in integrating financial markets.16  
Empirical results   
The first set of tests examines the significance of sector and country effects in the 
earnings yield. These tests are conducted separately for the sub-periods 1994-2000 
and 2001-2003 in order to capture any time variation that could be attributed to the 
increased integration of European financial markets, particularly the partial 
integration stemming from the introduction of a common currency in a number of the 
countries involved.  
It is expected that the sector effect would contribute most to the variation in the 
earnings yield and that the country effect would add relatively little explanatory 
power over and above the sector effect. The results reported in Table 2 show the 
outcome of introducing sector effects first and then adding country effects, and also 
vice versa. When controlling for each effect in this way, it is found that both are 
present and significant in each period. The R-squareds reported in Table 2 shows that 
sector effects alone account for 16.12% of the variation in the forward earnings yield 
in the first period and 13.76% in the second period, and that country effects alone 
                                                
15 It can be seen that the number of observations falls in later years. This is explained by the increasing 
number of firms that have switched to IAS or US GAAP, especially in Germany after the introduction 
of the New Market. 
16 The standard deviation of the risk free rate in the present sample decreases from 1994 (0.0163) to 
2003 (0.0039). 
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account first for 15.34% and then for 10.42%. It is notable however that the 
incremental explanatory power that arises from adding the country effects drops from 
4.57% for the early years to 3.69% after 2000, whereas the addition of sector effects 
causes the incremental explanatory power to increase between the two periods from 
5.35% to 7.03%. Indeed, given the lower joint significance of country effects after 
2000 (F test: 7.39 versus 16.68), this warrants a further examination of the country 
and sector effects in the different components of the earnings yields.  
A similar analysis of sector and country effects in the estimated risk premium and 
in the abnormal earnings yield is also presented in Table 2, under each of the three 
growth assumptions discussed earlier. With regard to the risk premium, sector effects 
appear to explain most of the variation and, although significant when taken alone, 
this time country effects appear to add little to the overall explanatory power (the 
incremental R2 through 2000 is 1.04%, 1.02% and 1.20% assuming long term growth 
respectively at the government bond rate, the inflation rate and at zero, and after 2000 
it is 0.56%, 0.64% and 0.59%). The main insight is that, having established that there 
is significant country variation at all times in the earnings yield, i.e., that accounting 
diversity remains present throughout, the risk premia on the other hand appear to be 
unaffected by accounting diversity, especially in the later years. In fact, country 
effects have no joint significance in the risk premium after 2000 (F test: 1.30, 1.26 
and 1.21 under each of the three growth assumptions). Bearing in mind that the 
estimated risk premia are constructed by means of accounting earnings expectations, 
this lends strong support to the inferences with respect to accounting harmonization. 
Whatever country-driven variation there might be in accounting earnings 
expectations, its influence appears to have been mitigated, as it should be if 
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accounting diversity has few economic consequences. This result corroborates the 
general inference drawn from Table 1, and illustrated by Figure 1, that accounting 
diversity drives the cross-country differences in the trade-off between risk premium 
components. Here, it is evident from Table 2 that cross-country differences indeed 
disappear once accounting diversity has been minimised.  
Finally, since we do not expect significant country effects in risk premia within 
relatively integrated markets, and this study shows that recently they no longer have 
explanatory power beyond sector effects, then it is consequent that the persistent 
country effects detected in the earnings yields are mostly driven by international 
differences in the rate of recognition of economic income. These differences are not 
expected to disappear until there is full harmonization between local accounting 
regimes in Europe. This inference is also supported by the analysis of the abnormal 
earnings yield, where the lower joint significance in the second period (e.g., F test 
when growth is set at the government bond yield: 5.36 versus 18.10) suggests that 
country effects in abnormal earnings yield, although declining, have not been 
eliminated, reflecting the earlier results with respect to the forward earnings yield. 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ACCOUNTING TRANSITION 
International Financial Reporting Standards, and US GAAP, are commonly 
acknowledged to impose a greater level of disclosure than is generally required by 
other sets of accounting rules and regulations (such is the argument for Germany, for 
example -- see Leuz, 2003). Recently, national regulatory bodies in Europe have been 
moving their own rules towards IFRS in order to enable the more general transition in 
 17 
2005. Moreover, certain firms in Europe have pre-empted the transition by reporting 
already under IFRS (and previously under IAS), and, in some cases, under US GAAP. 
In this study, it is argued that the main costs of a transition to IFRS or US GAAP are 
firm specific and are associated with the level and type of disclosure before switching. 
The greater the disclosure before the transition, and the closer the accounting policies 
to those set out in IFRS or US GAAP, the easier it is for market participants to 
connect the past with the future and hence to be able to unravel the accounting impact 
on future cash flows. Accounting standardization per se does not have economic 
consequences in integrated financial markets, as shown in the previous section. Thus, 
the transition to another set of accounting standards is expected to have economic 
consequences insofar as prior disclosure is not sufficient to inform market participants 
about the impact of accounting change. However, the costs involved are likely to be 
temporary and to dissipate following transition, with the economic consequences for 
any firm being more pronounced in the early stages of adoption, although this would 
all depend not only on disclosure levels but also on the set of standards that is 
adopted. As Barth, Clinch and Shibano (1999) demonstrate, adherence to a set of 
increased visibility GAAP can lead to market prices that more accurately reflect true 
value and a reduced cost of capital.  
With respect to the estimation of the effect of standard switching, the methodology 
followed is similar to that described above for the examination of local GAAP effects. 
We focus now, however, on the economic consequences of the transition by 
examining the risk premium associated with standard switching and its subsequent 
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evolution, conditional on the prior disclosure level as represented by the firm’s market 
capitalization before the transition.17 
With respect to the risk premium (r-rf), the following regression is run: 
GAAP
f
GAAP
D
( r r ) µ a β MC +γ ei s c i t i
D MCi
 
 
− = + + + + 
 × 
δ'         (10) 
where DGAAP is a dummy variable that distinguishes whether or not the accounting 
standards used by the firm in drawing up its financial statements are local or 
international (IAS/IFRS or US GAAP), taking the value of zero for those years in 
which the firm reports under the local rules and the value of one otherwise. The 
dummy variable is interacted with the prior level of disclosure, proxied by the firm’s 
market capitalization MCi, in order to control for the extent of pre-disclosure that 
prepared the ground for standard switching, with the respective main effects and 
interaction effects given by the inverse of the vector of coefficients δ.18 The sector, 
country and time period controls are also important in this respect, as evidence on the 
economic consequences of standard switching might be biased by particular sectors, 
or by adopters of international standards that originate in local GAAP regimes which 
                                                
17 Market capitalization is kept constant across years for each firm, at a value corresponding to the 
firm’s market capitalization in the year immediately prior to the transition. The idea of expressing pre-
disclosure (i.e., voluntary information release) as a function of market capitalization dates back to 
Atiase (1985). More recently, Leuz and Verrechia (2000) and Leuz (2003) also argue that larger firms 
tend to disclose more, and Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) employ market capitalization as a proxy for 
firm level disclosure in a study of voluntary switching to foreign GAAP.  
 
18 Vectors δ and λ in equations (10) and (11) correspond to coefficients δn in 
1
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are less harmonised internationally, or just because most of the transitions have taken 
place at a point in time when the risk premium is elevated.  
A further test examines whether or not the economic cost of transition is a 
transitory phenomenon that has a more pronounced effect in the initial period of 
application of the new set of standards. For this purpose, LGAAP represents the length 
of the adoption period, i.e., the number of years during which the firm’s financial 
statements have been prepared in accordance with IAS/IFRS or US GAAP. As above, 
this variable is also interacted with the prior level of disclosure, proxied by the firm’s 
market capitalization MCi, and in this case the respective main effects and interaction 
effects are given by the inverse of the vector of coefficients λ, as follows:  
GAAP
f
GAAP
L
( r r ) µ a β MC +γ ei s c i t i
L MCi
 
 
− = + + + + 
 × 
λ'                          (11) 
The IFRS sample (107 firms) comprises mainly German, Swiss and Austrian 
companies but also others from Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Italy and 
Portugal, all of which have switched to IFRS (or previously IAS) since 1995.19 The 
US GAAP sample comprises only 48 firms, the majority of which originate in 
Germany, with others from Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Greece, Italy and 
the Netherlands. The full sample includes firm-year observations for which an 
estimate of the cost of equity is feasible, for those firms for which there is also at least 
one observation of the cost of equity when they were reporting under their local 
GAAP. These strict criteria have generated 712 firm-year observations for firms that 
                                                
19 There are few cases where firms switched from IAS to local GAAP or to US GAAP (not included). 
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opted to report under IFRS and 243 firm-year observations under US GAAP, 
including cost of earnings yields and cost of capital estimates before and after the 
switch.  
Empirical results 
Due to the sampling procedure, some consideration of the behaviour of the risk 
premium in each firm series is required in the estimation. Therefore, a cross-sectional 
time series linear model is fitted using feasible generalized least squares. This allows 
estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional 
correlation across panels.  
Table 3, Panel A, presents the empirical evidence concerning the adoption of 
international standards, as set out in equation (10). With respect to the firms that opt 
for IFRS, such adoption appears to entail significant costs as the risk premium 
increases by an estimated 4.55% (the δ coefficient on DGAAP is significant at less than 
0.1%).20 This is especially so for smaller firms, as suggested by the negative sign on 
the DGAAP × MC interaction of the adoption dummy with market capitalization. 
Conversely, it may be inferred that the switch to IFRS has been less costly for firms 
that were already extensive disclosers. With regard to US GAAP, the estimated 
increase in the risk premium is at a similar level of 4.65%, although this is only 
weakly significant (p-value: 0.014) and there is no evidence of an effect of pre-
adoption disclosure. However, insofar as the adoption of US GAAP may entail the use 
of a more visible set of standards and a commitment to greater disclosure, transition 
                                                
20 Daske (2005) provides similar evidence on the occurrence of costs due to the transition to IFRS for 
German companies.  
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costs might fall quickly after the switch21. This issue is further examined by 
evaluating the impact of the length of experience with internationally recognised 
GAAP and, second, by means of a comparison of the impact of the disclosure effect 
on risk premia conditional on the set of standards employed.  
The results in Panel B of Table 3 suggest that risk premia associated with IFRS 
adoption are likely to decline as the length of the period of application is extended, as 
suggested by the negative sign of the estimated λ coefficient on LGAAP (albeit weakly 
significant with a p-value of 0.022).22 This correction is especially pronounced for 
firms whose disclosure level before IFRS adoption was limited, as suggested by the 
positive and significant coefficient on LGAAP × MC, the interaction between the length 
of the adoption period and market capitalization (p-value: 0.005). Note that these 
firms bear larger costs of transition overall, and combining the evidence reported in 
the two panels it now becomes clear that this result is likely to be driven primarily by 
the early years of IFRS adoption. On the other hand, this correction effect will be less 
pronounced for those firms that incurred lower costs in the first place.  
With regard to US GAAP, however, there is stronger evidence of a correction of 
the initial costs associated with adoption, which is suggested by the significantly 
negative λ coefficient on LGAAP (p-value < 0.001). Nevertheless, contrary to IFRS, the 
                                                
21 Bushee and Leuz (2005) demonstrate that the imposition of stricter mandated disclosure is associated 
with significant costs for smaller firms that have not filed previously with SEC, turning some of them 
towards less regulated markets. On the other hand, previous experience with SEC has significant 
benefits in terms of a permanent increase in liquidity and positive stock returns. 
22 Note that, in Panel B of Table 3, the number of firms and firm-year observations is reduced with 
respect to Panel A. This is due both to the research design, which in this case takes into account only 
the sub-sample of firms that have switched to internationally recognised GAAP, and to the use of a 
feasible GLS regression that excludes firms with just one available firm-year observation. A similar 
GLS regression, which does not take into account the autocorrelation within the firm (while allowing 
for heteroscedasticity), yields qualitatively equivalent results based on the same number firms as in 
Panel A.  
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level of pre-adoption disclosure appears to have no effect on the decrease in the risk 
premia after the adoption of US GAAP, as suggested by the insignificant λ coefficient 
on the interaction between LGAAP and MC (p-value: 0.284). The initial finding of 
(albeit weakly) significant costs associated with a switch to US GAAP appears also to 
be driven by the first year of transition. Note the magnitudes of δDGAAP and λLGAAP are 
respectively 0.0465 and -0.0508, whilst the corresponding estimates under IFRS are   
0.0455 and -0.0130, which implies that it takes longer for the initial transition costs to 
abate under IFRS.  
The evidence in Table 3 suggests that, although there are costs associated with the 
transition to internationally recognised GAAP, these are likely to be transitory. The 
transitory nature of adoption costs is especially pronounced for firms characterised by 
limited disclosure before their switch to IFRS, and for all firms that switch to US 
GAAP regardless of their pre-adoption level of disclosure. It is possible that the 
enhanced visibility and transparency of US GAAP ensures that transition costs fade 
out quickly, as shown in Panel B. This issue is further examined in the following 
section by associating levels of disclosure with risk premia after firms have switched 
to foreign GAAP. 
TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE 
The empirical evidence set out above suggests that extensive prior disclosure may 
decrease the costs of a switch to a new set of accounting standards in terms of the 
firm’s risk premium. This finding is in line with evidence reported elsewhere of a 
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negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital.23 This is because 
financial transparency, and timely and adequate disclosure, facilitate the external 
monitoring of managers, reduce the risk of expropriation from shareholders, and 
therefore lower the expected rate of return that investors demand on their capital.
24
 In 
this study, we posit that, as capital markets become more integrated, country-specific 
factors will tend to lose their importance in explaining differences between firms in 
the cost of equity capital. As a result, investors will rely primarily on firm level 
disclosure. Moreover, a firm’s commitment to better disclosure and greater financial 
transparency will reduce information asymmetries between insiders (managers or 
controlling shareholders) and outsiders (minority shareholders, creditors and other 
stakeholders). In particular, the adoption of internationally recognised reporting 
standards such as IFRS or US GAAP will commit the firm to regimes that make it 
more difficult for insiders to conceal private control benefits from outsiders. 25 
Whether the reduction in information asymmetry that lowers the rate of return 
                                                
23 Hail (2002) shows that firms which disclose more on a voluntary basis enjoy a lower cost of capital. 
Further evidence of this negative relationship is provided by Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Leuz and 
Hail (2003). Although public disclosure may remove uncertainty about the firm’s earnings and reduce 
risk accordingly, this may be more than offset by increases in the cost of capital arising from more 
precise private information (Botosan, Plumlee, and Xie, 2004). Moreover, accounting restatements 
initiated by the firm’s auditors, the regulatory authorities or the firm itself can lead to increases in the 
firm’s cost of equity capital, which is consistent with lowering the perceived earnings quality of the 
firm and increasing investors’ required rates of return (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004).  
24 At the country level, financial transparency is shown by Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) to be 
higher when there is a lower risk of actions by the state that influence the required rate of return in a 
negative manner. Further evidence on the incorporation of market and firm information into stock 
prices is given in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), and the association between the disclosure of 
accounting information and corporate governance systems is considered in Bushman, Chen, Engel and 
Smith (2004). Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) provide evidence that differences in earnings 
management across countries may be attributed to corporate governance mechanisms, as, in the 
absence of strong protection, insiders tend to use earnings management to protect their own interests by 
concealing firm performance from outsiders. 
25 Whilst US GAAP are often portrayed as the benchmark for high-quality standards and for providing 
relevant information to the capital markets (Levitt, 1998, McGregor, 1999), recent empirical research 
suggests that there is no evidence that US GAAP result in higher information quality than IAS/IFRS. 
Rather, it has been demonstrated that both set of standards reduce information asymmetries in capital 
markets equally well (and better compared to the local GAAP) once they are embedded in the same 
regulatory environment (Leuz, 2003).  
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required by equity capital providers is better secured by adoption of IFRS or US 
GAAP is an empirical question. Consequently, this last section of the paper 
investigates the magnitude of the effect of firm level disclosure on the required rate of 
return in terms of firm’s risk premium conditional upon the firm’s choice between the 
two different sets of internationally recognised accounting standards. 
As a measure of firm level disclosure practices, we use the scores constructed in 
Standard and Poor’s Financial Transparency and Disclosure (2002) survey. The 
survey focuses on a wide range of attributes and their coverage in key public 
documents released by companies. These attributes are grouped into three broad 
categories, concerning: (a) ownership structures and investor rights, (b) financial 
transparency and (c) board and management structure and process. These are further 
broken down into twelve sub-categories, and cover seventy two different topics in 
total. A score of 1 is assigned to a firm for each attribute that is found to be present 
and 0 if otherwise. Panel A of Table 5, which shows the median transparency and 
disclosure score across countries and sectors, and also with respect to the accounting 
standards adopted by the firms involved. These indicate a far wider range across 
countries (from 43.01 for Austria to 71.88 for the UK) than across sectors (from 64.89 
for Basic Industries to 70.97 for Energy). Moreover, it can be seen that the financial 
transparency is no different on average for European firms adopting US GAAP than 
for those firms that continued to report in accordance with local standards, whilst 
early IFRS adopters tend to have a lower score.26  
                                                
26 See: http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/Transparency_and_Disclosure_Study_ 
Europe.pdf. Further details are given in Khanna et al. (2004), who suggest that Standard and Poor’s 
Financial Transparency and Disclosure scores measure disclosure levels against an implicit US rather 
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The effect of firm level disclosure on the risk premium is tested using a similar 
methodology to that employed for the examination of accounting transition effects, as 
follows: 
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where TD is a continuous variable that corresponds to a firm’s transparency and 
disclosure score and DGAAP is a dummy variable that distinguishes the set of 
accounting standards applied by the firm, taking the value of 1 if a particular set of 
standards is followed (local, IFRS or US GAAP) and 0 otherwise. These two variables 
are further interacted in order to measure the effect of disclosure conditional on the 
firm’s choice of GAAP, and size is also included as a covariate. The relevant main 
effects and interaction effects are given by the inverse of the vector of coefficients δ. 
As previously, controls for sector, country, firm and time are also added to the model. 
Empirical results 
Panel B of Table 4 sets out the results from regression (12) using the full set of 
controls. We find that the firm’s disclosure scores individually increase the risk 
premium, as indicated by the positive δ coefficients on the variable TD, which are 
significant for local accounting standards (p-value = 0.025), IFRS (p-value < 0.001) 
and US GAAP (p-value < 0.001). This finding corroborates the results reported in 
Table 3, suggesting that increased transparency adds to the risk premium and that 
disclosure at a higher standard is costly. However, the incremental effect of the firm’s 
                                                                                                                                       
than a global benchmark. It should be noted therefore that the scores measure the extent of convergence 
to US disclosure practices rather than providing an absolute measure of disclosure quality. 
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disclosure level on the risk premium varies depending on whether a firm follows local 
standards, IFRS or US GAAP. Following local accounting standards seems to be 
incrementally costly, as implied by the positive and significant δ coefficient (0.0315) 
on the interaction term DGAAP × TD. For firms that prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS, the coefficient on DGAAP × TD is not significantly different 
from zero, implying that the fact that firms prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS neither increases nor reduces the costs of increased disclosure 
and transparency. On the contrary, for firms that have chosen to adopt US GAAP, the 
total effect of disclosure is to reduce the risk premium, there being a negative and 
statistically significant interaction coefficient (-0.1901).27 This result suggests that 
market participants are ready to pay a premium for firms that commit to more 
transparent disclosure in accordance with US GAAP (i.e., by reducing the premium 
demanded for risk).
28
 One possible explanation for this finding is that, in our sample, 
the majority of firms that adopt US GAAP are cross-listed in the US (around 85%).29  
A firm’s exposure to SEC enforcement of strict US disclosure requirements signals 
such commitment to market participants, who are aware of the increased exposure to 
                                                
27 We have also estimated (12) using the alternative specifications of the risk premium and excluding 
the control for size effect. The results obtained (not tabulated) are very similar to those reported in 
Table 4.   
28 Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2004) provide evidence that, among firms cross listed in the US, those that 
prepare local accounts in accordance with US GAAP show less evidence of earnings management than 
those that merely reconcile earnings to US GAAP. This is especially the case if the firms are domiciled 
in jurisdictions offering weak investor protection, suggesting that the extra layer of regulation imposed 
by the SEC does not replace the effect of the regulatory environment in the firm’s country of domicile.   
29 For a cross-listing on a US stock exchange, firms have to file with the SEC, especially if they are to 
list at the NYSE, thus subjecting themselves to SEC enforcement rules. 67% of firms from our sample 
that cross-list in the US are listed at the NYSE, and 18% are listed on the OTC market.  
 27 
litigation risks if the firm fails to meet the standards required30. In this respect, 
adopters of IFRS are not on an equal footing. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study focuses on the European setting where different GAAP regimes have 
long been in force, albeit in the presence of gradual harmonization. The economic 
consequences of such diversity in European accounting stem from the inability of 
market participants to see through differences in the conservatism bias in financial 
accounts, which is attributable to the different sets of GAAP in operation.  This paper 
is based on the Abnormal Earnings Growth equity valuation model that describes how 
the conservatism bias in the forward earnings yield can be corrected by subsequent 
expected earnings growth. 
It is shown empirically that accounting diversity is likely to be of little importance 
in integrating financial markets. Given this finding, we might expect a similarly 
inconsequential effect from a switch between standards, or simply a decrease in the 
risk premium if the firm switches to a higher disclosure regime. However, the switch 
to internationally recognised GAAP is shown here to entail at least short lived costs, 
which depend not only on the set of standards adopted but also the level of pre-
adoption disclosure.  Further examination of the impact of post-adoption disclosure on 
                                                
30 Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) demonstrate that firms with ADRs experience increases in valuation 
around the time of cross listing in the US, which is consistent with these firms enjoying a lower cost of 
capital. In addition, Leuz and Hail (2004) provide evidence that cross-listing on a US stock market 
reduces the firm’s cost of capital and that this effect is larger for firms domiciled in countries with 
weaker institutional structures, cross-listing being their way of ‘opting out’ of the regulatory framework 
in the country of domicile.  
 28 
the implied  risk premia of firms confirms that the adoption of a more visible set of 
standards enhances the firm level disclosure effects.  
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that accounting diversity per se does not 
have costs as long as the underlying economies are converging. However, this does 
not hold in the case of an accounting regime switch, where there are economic 
consequences which are likely to depend on firm level disclosure efforts around the 
switch, as well as the standing of the GAAP that are adopted. The more disclosure and 
the more visible the GAAP, the faster the costs of switching to another set of 
standards is eliminated.  
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TABLE 1. Forward Earnings Yield and its Components 
Panel A. Medians by country 
  
  
 
 
Long term growth 
= government bond 
yield 
Long term growth  
= future inflation 
Long term growth  
= 0 
Country 
Number of 
observations 
Forward 
earnings 
yield 
Risk  
free  
rate 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Austria 157 0.0680 0.0586 0.0776 0.0685 0.0671 0.0504 0.0639 0.0445 
Belgium 431 0.0703 0.0528 0.0806 0.0613 0.0719 0.0502 0.0676 0.0456 
Denmark 480 0.0737 0.0550 0.0743 0.0628 0.0669 0.0509 0.0629 0.0441 
Finland 584 0.0682 0.0514 0.0966 0.0759 0.0833 0.0607 0.0809 0.0578 
France 1855 0.0649 0.0504 0.0800 0.0664 0.0693 0.0540 0.0657 0.0493 
Germany 826 0.0548 0.0520 0.0734 0.0711 0.0604 0.0552 0.0568 0.0509 
Greece 300 0.0585 0.0595 0.0806 0.0898 0.0662 0.0766 0.0566 0.0642 
Ireland 99 0.0847 0.0507 0.0779 0.0426 0.0765 0.0395 0.0717 0.0311 
Italy 860 0.0574 0.0530 0.0789 0.0779 0.0683 0.0638 0.0604 0.0560 
Netherlands 950 0.0885 0.0528 0.0730 0.0421 0.0684 0.0350 0.0668 0.0295 
Norway 541 0.0713 0.0601 0.0965 0.0811 0.0848 0.0677 0.0805 0.0618 
Portugal 228 0.0624 0.0528 0.0782 0.0719 0.0675 0.0602 0.0587 0.0523 
Spain 664 0.0733 0.0520 0.0742 0.0601 0.0644 0.0499 0.0584 0.0426 
Sweden 931 0.0605 0.0524 0.0792 0.0777 0.0663 0.0599 0.0631 0.0562 
Switzerland 368 0.0648 0.0355 0.0845 0.0519 0.0778 0.0433 0.0767 0.0417 
UK 2121 0.0748 0.0539 0.0706 0.0568 0.0618 0.0459 0.0568 0.0399 
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TABLE 1. Forward Earnings Yield and its Components 
Panel B. Medians by sector 
 
  
 
 
Long term growth 
= government bond 
yield 
Long term growth  
= future inflation 
Long term growth  
= 0 
Sector 
Number of 
observations 
Forward 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
free 
rate 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Basic industries 1057 0.0812 0.0536 0.0986 0.0726 0.0868 0.0594 0.0833 0.0552 
Capital goods 2619 0.0779 0.0530 0.0824 0.0617 0.0730 0.0496 0.0699 0.0445 
Consumer durables 300 0.0919 0.0528 0.0941 0.0569 0.0843 0.0463 0.0821 0.0430 
Consumer non-durables 1081 0.0733 0.0524 0.0736 0.0544 0.0649 0.0438 0.0618 0.0386 
Consumer services 1995 0.0595 0.0520 0.0716 0.0669 0.0607 0.0544 0.0558 0.0482 
Energy 313 0.0701 0.0533 0.0888 0.0700 0.0770 0.0572 0.0729 0.0509 
Finance 2021 0.0671 0.0527 0.0678 0.0571 0.0591 0.0453 0.0549 0.0398 
Health care 426 0.0501 0.0505 0.0602 0.0635 0.0479 0.0502 0.0430 0.0440 
Public Utilities 343 0.0521 0.0530 0.0558 0.0631 0.0445 0.0475 0.0399 0.0409 
Technology 822 0.0473 0.0492 0.0946 0.0934 0.0830 0.0800 0.0772 0.0729 
Transportation 418 0.0767 0.0550 0.0948 0.0706 0.0827 0.0577 0.0779 0.0531 
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TABLE 1. Forward Earnings Yield and its Components 
Panel C. Medians by year 
 
  
 
 
Long term growth 
= government bond 
yield 
Long term growth  
= future inflation 
Long term growth  
= 0 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
Forward 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
free 
rate 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
1994 870 0.0678 0.0865 0.0711 0.0902 0.0485 0.0657 0.0426 0.0584 
1995 977 0.0769 0.0732 0.0718 0.0682 0.0579 0.0503 0.0535 0.0448 
1996 1172 0.0659 0.0634 0.0652 0.0677 0.0520 0.0513 0.0474 0.0457 
1997 1305 0.0614 0.0558 0.0654 0.0593 0.0544 0.0451 0.0511 0.0413 
1998 1349 0.0647 0.0408 0.0762 0.0527 0.0707 0.0455 0.0683 0.0405 
1999 1203 0.0632 0.0537 0.0658 0.0620 0.0588 0.0507 0.0532 0.0431 
2000 1278 0.0679 0.0504 0.0801 0.0632 0.0726 0.0528 0.0680 0.0463 
2001 1149 0.0708 0.0490 0.0897 0.0679 0.0818 0.0594 0.0774 0.0533 
2002 1063 0.0862 0.0445 0.1119 0.0698 0.1057 0.0623 0.1008 0.0568 
2003 1029 0.0670 0.0435 0.0859 0.0639 0.0782 0.0541 0.0742 0.0500 
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TABLE 2. Country and Sector Variation 
 
  
 
 
Long term growth 
= government bond 
yield 
Long term growth  
= future inflation 
Long term growth  
= 0 
  
Degrees of 
freedom 
Forward 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
Risk 
premium 
Abnormal 
earnings 
yield 
         
1994-2000 
R-squared         
Sector effects αs  16.12% 16.52% 3.15% 18.03% 4.17% 18.81% 4.60% 
Country effects βc  15.34% 14.61% 6.10% 15.78% 5.76% 16.56% 6.08% 
Sector effects αs + country effects βc  20.69% 17.56% 7.87% 19.05% 7.76% 20.01% 8.03% 
Wald F test         
Joint country effects test  F(15,2456) 16.68 4.05 18.10 3.77 13.36 4.82 12.81 
   p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Joint sector effects test  F(10,2456) 37.29 16.77 7.89 19.08 8.48 20.38 8.30 
   p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
         
2001-2003 
R-squared         
Sector effects αs  13.76% 20.76% 11.66% 21.01% 11.76% 21.82% 12.42% 
Country effects βc  10.42% 19.35% 10.49% 19.64% 10.31% 20.34% 11.17% 
Sector effects αs + country effects βc  17.45% 21.32% 14.40% 21.65% 13.94% 22.41% 14.61% 
Wald F test         
Joint country effects test  F(15,2456) 7.39 1.30 5.36 1.26 4.30 1.21 4.47 
   p-value <0.001 0.254 <0.001 0.220 <0.001 0.197 <0.001 
Joint sector effects test  F(10,2456) 22.03 5.07 11.37 5.27 10.43 5.53 9.91 
   p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
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Note: The estimated model µ α β γ MC es c t i i+ + + + +  includes αs sector effects, βc country effects and γt time effects. A size control (MCi , the log of 
market capitalization in US$) is also included as a covariate to account for scale effects, and the estimated coefficient ranged between and –0.0041 and 
–0.0175. The country and sector effects are not shown in detail, as their computation in STATA’s cluster regression is with respect to one particular 
country or sector that is aliased arbitrarily in the estimation procedure. The joint significance test for the equality of country or sector means allows for 
the fact that observations are not independent within the same firm, and the appropriate test is therefore a Wald test, with an F distribution. The 
variance-covariance matrix provides diagnostics at the firm level, and thus the number of degrees of freedom reflects the number of firms and not the 
number of firm-year observations.  
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TABLE 3. Economic Consequences 
Panel A.  The economic consequences of accounting transition  
GAAP
f
GAAP
D
( r r ) µ a β MC +γ ei s c i t i
D MCi
 
 
− = + + + + 
 × 
δ'  
 
           IFRS 
 
           US GAAP 
 Coefficients z-statistic p-value Coefficients z-statistic p-value 
Constant 0.1355 7.85 <0.001 0.1809 6.46 <0.001 
DGAAP 0.0455 4.19 <0.001 0.0465 2.46 0.014 
DGAAP·MCi -0.0049 -3.54 <0.001 -0.0038 -1.51 0.131 
MCi -0.0047 -2.73 0.006 -0.0102 -4.11 <0.001 
 
Number of observations 712   
 
243   
Number of groups  107   48   
Wald test (chi-squared)  297.78***   2450.75***   
 
 
Panel B. The transitory nature of the economic consequences of transition 
GAAP
f
GAAP
L
( r r ) µ a β MC +γ ei s c i t i
L MCi
 
 
− = + + + + 
 × 
λ'  
 
            IFRS 
 
           US GAAP 
 Coefficients z-statistic p-value Coefficients z-statistic p-value 
Constant 0.2333 5.60 <0.001 0.0993 1.19 0.234 
LGAAP -0.0130 -2.29 0.022 -0.0508 -5.05 <0.001 
LGAAP·MCi 0.0019 2.84 0.005 0.0010 1.07 0.284 
MCi -0.0177 -8.19 <0.001 -0.0190 -6.02 <0.001 
 
Number of observations 307   
 
90   
Number of groups 81   27   
Wald test (chi-squared) 937.18***   3890.10***   
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Notes: (r-rf)i is the risk premium of firm i (assuming no long term growth), αs sector effects, βc country effects and γt time effects. δ′ and λ′  are 
inverted vectors of parameters on:- MCi the log of the market capitalization of the i
th firm, DGAAP a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
particular set of standards is followed and 0 otherwise, and LGAAP the number of years during which the firm’s financial statements have been prepared 
in accordance with those standards. The constant may be interpreted as the risk premium of a firm with minimum disclosure. The model is estimated by 
feasible generalized least squares regression in order to control for the presence heteroskedasticity. The Wald test statistic that is reported has a chi-
squared distribution.   
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TABLE 4. Transparency and Disclosure  
Panel A.  Standard & Poor’s Financial Transparency and Disclosure Scores by Country and by Sector 
    
Country Median Score Sector Median Score 
Austria 43.01 Basic industries 64.89 
Belgium 60.64 Capital goods 63.83 
Denmark 60.00 Consumer durables 68.09 
Finland 75.26 Consumer non-durables 61.70 
France 69.52 Consumer services 63.27 
Germany 54.88 Energy 70.97 
Greece 68.04 Finance 64.89 
Ireland 71.88 Health care 67.35 
Italy 53.06 Public Utilities 64.95 
Netherlands 62.89 Technology 67.78 
Norway 49.46 Transportation 59.22 
Portugal 54.26   
Spain 57.14 GAAP Regime  
Sweden 61.86 Local GAAP 63.75 
Switzerland 63.92 US GAAP 64.54 
UK 71.88 IAS/IFRS 58.37 
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TABLE 4. Transparency and Disclosure  
Panel B.  Analysis of GAAP Regimes 
( )
it
i
iGAAP
i
GAAP
csif
eγ
MC
TDD
TD
D
βαµrr ++












×
+++=− 'δ  
 
             Local GAAP          IFRS       US GAAP 
  Coefficients z-statistic p-value Coefficients z-statistic p-value Coefficients z-statistic p-value 
Constant  0.1529 10.63 <0.001 0.1412 13.96 <0.001 0.1318 12.55 <0.001 
DGAAP  -0.0251 -2.30 0.021 0.0034 0.31 0.758 0.1264 4.15 <0.001 
  0.1278 11.93 <0.001 0.1446 10.22 <0.001 0.2582 8.07 <0.001 
           
TDi  0.0372 2.25 0.025 0.0661 9.80 <0.001 0.0691 10.63 <0.001 
DGAAP·TDi 0.0315 1.83 0.067 0.0021 0.11 0.909 -0.1901 -4.09 <0.001 
  0.0687 10.12 <0.001 0.0683 3.84 <0.001 -0.1209 -2.61 0.009 
           
MCi  -0.0112398 -16.65 0.000 -0.0113941 -16.68 0.000 -0.0112761 -16.5 0.000 
           
Number of observations 1294   1294   1294   
Number of groups 254   254   254   
Wald test (chi-squared) 1941.04   1943.67   1956.23   
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Notes: (r-rf)i is the risk premium of firm i (assuming no long term growth), αs sector effects, βc country effects and γt time effects. δ′ is an inverted 
vector of parameters on:- MCi the log of the market capitalization of the i
th firm, DGAAP a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a particular set of 
standards is followed and 0 otherwise and TDi the S&P transparency and disclosure score of firm i (scaled by 100, from 0 to 1). The constant may be 
interpreted as the risk premium of a firm with minimum disclosure. The full sample includes 1294 firm-year observations for those firms for which 
there is at least one observation of the cost of equity when they were reporting under their local GAAP. The model is estimated by means of a feasible 
generalized least squares regression in order to control for the presence heteroskedasticity. The Wald test statistic that is reported has a chi-squared 
distribution. 
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FIGURE 1.  Abnormal Earnings  and Forward Earnings 
 
 
 
By Country
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Forward Earnings Yield
A
b
n
o
rm
al
 E
ar
n
in
g
s 
Y
ie
ld
 
By Sector
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Forward Earnings Yield
A
b
n
o
rm
al
 E
ar
n
in
g
s 
Y
ie
ld
 
 
Long term growth assumptions
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Note: The indicative slopes have been estimated from the country and sector 
medians reported in Table 2 for the forward earnings yield and the abnormal 
earnings yield under each of the three long term growth assumptions. The fitted 
lines by sector exclude technology, given the unusual circumstances surrounding 
the internet bubble in the 1990s, the high abnormal earnings yield in that sector 
being evident at the top left of the graph.   
 
